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CHAPTER ONE 
 
1.0. INTRODUCTION 
Judicial review describes the process by which the courts exercise a supervisory 
jurisdiction over the activities of the public authorities in the field of public law. 
The primary method by which this control is exercised is through the application 
for judicial review.1 
The system of judicial review applies principles of administrative law to all areas 
of government activities.2 It helps to ensure that decisions of public authorities 
conform to legal principles and observe fair procedures. The grounds for seeking 
judicial review were reformulated by Lord Diplock3 under three heads namely, 
illegality, irrationality and procedural impropriety. 
In many countries including Uganda, judicial review is a key means of protecting 
fundamental rights and liberties and ensuring that citizens are not unjustifiably 
denied of these rights. It is asserted that “an Act of Parliament which seeks to 
restrict or eliminate judicial review will not find favor with the courts.”4  
Techniques of judicial review are often used to enforce the constitution.5 
 
 
1.1. METHODOLOGY 
In this paper, I shall argue that judicial review is an effective safeguard for 
protecting the freedom of expression in Uganda. I shall briefly describe the concept 
of judicial review as understood in administrative law. I shall then analyse, judicial 
review in the constitutional perspective, the constitutional foundations of judicial 
                                                          
1
 Clive Lewis, Judicial Remedies in Public Law, 4th edn. Sweet and Maxwell. 2009, Pg 9 and Lord Denning: The 
Closing Chapter, Oxford University Press. Pg. 117- 124 
2
 The system was inherited from Britain. I.I Massey: Administrative Law 6th Edition. Pg. 238. 
3
 Council of Civil Service Unions (CCSU) v Minister of State for the Civil Service (1985) AC 374, HL and Jonathan 
Manning, Judicial Review Proceedings, A Practitioner’s Guide to Advice and Representation. 2nd Edn. LAG 
Education and Service Trust Limited. Pg. 119. 
4
 R v Medical Appeal Tribunal ex p. Gilmore 1957 1 Q. B. 574. Pg. 583. 
5
 Anthony Bradley, Judicial Review Human Rights and their Protection in Public Law, 2011,  Lecture Notes, 
Themes in Legislative Studies Week 12- Judicial Review http://studyonline.sas.ac.uk/course/view/php?id. Pg. 1 
and id. Manning, pg. 121. 
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review in Uganda as well as the constitutional protection of freedom of expression 
in Uganda. 
 
I shall analyse three cases decided by the constitutional and Supreme courts to 
illustrate, the effectiveness of judicial review in safeguarding the protection of the 
freedom of expression in Uganda. Analysis of each case begins with the brief facts 
of the case, a discussion of the fundamental right, the measure employed by the 
court to protect the right, a determination of whether the measure was effective and 
the effect of the decision of the court on legislative reform in Uganda. 
I shall also analyse the status of legislative reform of laws affecting the freedom of 
expression in Uganda to illustrate the government efforts in ensuring that freedom 
of expression is enjoyed by all citizens according to the Constitution and determine 
whether or not the laws conform to the Constitution and what the government 
needs to do to ensure the laws are in conformity with the Constitution. 
 
Lessons for drafters, Government and Parliament shall be drawn from the cases 
discussed and recommendations made for developing the legal regime on freedom 
of expression without breaching the constitutional protection of the freedom. 
 
I shall review primary and secondary literature, websites, case law and information 
gathered from interviews with experts on the subject. 
  
 
1.2. HYPOTHESIS 
The substance of this paper is that in view of the unconstitutionality of laws 
relating to freedom of expression in Uganda, judicial review has served as a 
safeguard for protecting that freedom. 
Judicial review is approached in this paper, from the constitutional perspective, as 
a remedy for breach of constitutionally protected rights and freedoms with special 
focus on the freedom of expression. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
2.0. JUDICIAL REVIEW: CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
(a) Introduction 
 
The duty to check the executive, both the political arm of the executive and the 
bureaucratic arm, and make it accountable for each of the acts taken by a member 
of the executive arm was the responsibility of Parliament.6 This however changed 
with the emergence of organised political parties.7 
  
Accordingly, Parliament became dominated by the political parties and this 
diminished its power to effectively check the executive since more often than not 
the head of the executive is one of the most influential members of the dominant 
party in Parliament. “Judicial review was therefore born to give power to the courts 
to examine executive acts to counter the declining ability of Parliament to 
effectively check the executive.” 8 
 
(b) Constitutional Foundations of Judicial Review in Uganda 
The power of the courts in Uganda before 1995 was “strictly limited to the 
interpretation of the law as enacted by Parliament.”9 There was no special court 
charged with the duty to interpret either the constitution or to review legislation. 
During the constitution making process, special considerations arose in respect of 
the interpretation and application of the Constitution. These considerations 
included a wide range of potential matters including “relations between organs of 
the State, questions about the constitutionality of laws passed by Parliament and 
actions taken by the executive and the officers who serve it.”10 The views of the 
                                                          
6
 Report of the Uganda Constitutional Commission: Analysis and Recommendations, (Odoki Report) 1992 pg. 252.  
www.constitutionnet.org/node/10749. 
7Id Chapter Eight, pg. 181 and the 1995 Uganda Constitution (the “Constitution”) Laws of Uganda Volume 1. 
www.ugandaonlinelawlibrary.net/file/constitution-1995.pdf. Articles 69 -76 pgs. 65-68. 
8
 Denis Kibirige Kawooya, Judicial Review by the Constitutional Court in Uganda: Lessons for the Drafter. Essay 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree in Advanced Legislative Studies of the 
University of London 2008-2009. (Unreported) www.studyonline.sas.ac.uk 
9
 Peter Walubiri ‘Towards a New Judicature in Uganda: From Reluctant Guards to Centurions of Justice’ Peter M. 
Walubiri (ed) Uganda: Constitutionalism at Cross Roads (Uganda Law Watch Kampala 1998) 135-208 at 138. 
10
 Id. Odoki Report pg. 426. 
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people were such that the role of interpreting the Constitution would best be served 
by the courts given the history of political turmoil in Uganda. 
In 1995, with the advent of a new constitutional order, provision was made within 
the constitution and the existing court structure for a constitutional court to 
interpret the constitution. Accordingly, article 13711 of the Constitution establishes 
the Court of Appeal as the constitutional court and gives it jurisdiction to deal with 
questions relating to the interpretation of the constitution. 
According to Elliot, the constitutional foundations of judicial review may be traced 
to “the requirement that the executive exercises its power fairly, reasonably and 
consistently with the scheme which Parliament in the first place prescribed in the 
enabling legislation.”12 
Wolfe argues that “judicial review is firmly rooted in the obligation of the judge to 
prefer the constitution to an ordinary statute in cases where the two conflict.13 
In terms of judicial review therefore, a person who alleges that an Act of 
Parliament or any other law or anything in or done under the authority of any law 
is inconsistent with or in contravention of a provision of the Constitution may 
petition the constitutional court for a declaration to that effect and for redress 
where appropriate. 
Therefore in the constitutional context, judicial review refers to the power of the 
courts to control the compatibility of legislation and executive acts with the terms 
of the constitution.14 This power is now contained in article 137. The advantage of 
having a specialised and centralised court dealing with constitutional matters can 
be found in the ability of such a court to distinguish constitutional issues from the 
“technical legalisms they often come wrapped within.”15 
Over the last few years, the constitutional court in Uganda has made use of this 
power to check the legislative authority of Parliament. Since 1995, the 
                                                          
11
 Pg. 109. 
12
 Mark Elliot, The Constitutional Foundations of Judicial Review (Hart Publishing Oxford 2001) 2. 
13
 Christopher Wolfe The Rise of Modern Judicial Review: From Constitutional Interpretation to Judge made Law 
(Littlefield Adams Quality Paperbacks, London 1994) at 76. 
14
 Eric Barendt, An Introduction to Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press London 1998) 17. 
15
 Christopher F. Zurn Deliberative Democracy and the Institutions of Judicial Review (Cambridge University Press, 
New York, 2007) at 85. 
5 
 
constitutional court has judicially struck down Acts of Parliament in exercise of 
this power for being in contravention of the Constitution.16 
 
Accordingly, in the constitutional setting of Uganda, the constitutional court is 
entrusted with the duty to test the constitutional validity of Acts of Parliament. 
(c) Purpose of Judicial Review: 
The purpose of judicial review in a constitutional system such as Uganda is to 
ensure that the Constitution prevails over legislative enactments which are contrary 
to it in such a way that any legislative enactment contrary to the Constitution 
cannot be law “otherwise the Constitution would be reduced to a worthless attempt 
to limit a power which is by its very nature illimitable.”17  
It should be noted however that the powers of judicial review “are given not with a 
view to make the judiciary a supreme body superior to the other arms of the 
constitutional framework”18 but to ensure a system of checks and balances between 
the legislative and the executive on the one hand and the judiciary on the other 
hand. The mechanism has been devised to function in such a way that the 
unconstitutional actions of one of the wings are corrected by the other. 
The purpose of judicial review is however “not to criticise legislative or executive 
actions as the opposition is expected to fulfill this function in a democratic polity.” 
On the contrary, the judiciary’s role is to review executive and legislative actions 
and declare whether those actions conform to the dictates of the Constitution.19 
  
 
 
                                                          
16
 Ssemogerere and Others v Attorney General, Constitutional Petition No. 3 of 1999(2000) UGA J No. 1 
Constitutional Court. www.safilii.org/ug/cases/UGCC/recent.html (Semwogerere case) It explains elaborately 
the import of article 137. 
17
 Per Marshall CJ in Marbury v Madison 1 Cranch 137 (1803) at 177. 
18
 Amicus Curiae Issue no. 2007. Judicial Activism and Overreach in India R. Shunmugasundaram. Article taken 
from Lecture at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies in 2007. Pg. 22.  
http://studyonline.sas.ac.uk/course/view/php?id 
19
 Id. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
3.0. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION OF FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION 
 
According to Dubick, “of the various rights enjoyed in a free society, freedom of 
expression may well be the most important. To dispense with the freedom of 
expression is to invite incursions on other rights and the authoritarian system of 
government. It is in this sense that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of 
expression has no equal”.20  
 
The recognition and protection of the freedom of expression is not a new 
development in Uganda’s constitutional history. Article 26 of the 1962 
independence Constitution21 provided for the protection of freedom of expression.  
 
This same article was restated in article 17 of the 1967 Constitution.22 Article 26 
provided for the freedom of expression as follows: 
 
“26. (1) Except with his own consent, no person shall be hindered in the enjoyment 
of his freedom of expression, that is to say, freedom to hold opinions and to receive 
and impart ideas and information without interference, and freedom from 
interference with his correspondence. 
 
      (2) Nothing contained or done under the authority of any law shall be held to 
be inconsistent with or in contravention of this article to the extent that the law in 
question makes provision, 
 
(a) that is reasonably required in the interests of national economy, the 
running of essential services, defence, public safety, public order, public 
morality or public health; or 
 
       (b)  that is reasonably required for the purpose of protecting the reputations, 
right and freedoms of other persons or the private lives of persons 
……….; or 
                                                          
20Dubick, Keith, “The Theoretical Foundations for Protecting Freedom of Expression” (2001) Journal of 
Constitutional Law, vol 13 at 1-2. 
21
 Laws of Uganda, vol 1 1964, SI 1962 No. 2175 pg. 54. 
22
 Id, pg. 16. 
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(c)  that imposes restrictions upon public officers, and except so far as that 
provision or, as the case may be, the thing done under the authority 
thereof is shown not to be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society.” 
 
A reading of this provision suggests that what is perceived as freedom of 
expression is limited hence making the protection of this freedom extremely 
restrictive. Ojambo23 has rightly observed that “the extensive, imprecise drawbacks 
that formed part of the relevant article would have left very little room for 
meaningful enjoyment of the right in issue.” It appears therefore that the 1962 and 
1967 Constitutions gave the freedom of expression with one hand (26 (1)) and at 
the same time took it away with the other hand (26 (2)). 
 
It will be observed that the Constitution24 departed from the 1962 and 1967 
Constitution provisions of protection of freedom of expression in particular but 
fundamental rights in general. Article 29 of the Constitution25 provides for the 
protection of freedom of conscience, expression, movement, religion, assembly 
and association. Sub article (1) (a) provides for the right to the enjoyment of the 
freedom of speech and expression by everyone and this freedom includes the 
freedom of the press and other media. The freedoms of speech or of the press are a 
special freedom within the scope of freedom of expression.26 
  
The Constitution like the 1962 and 1967 Constitutions also provides for limitations 
on the exercise and enjoyment of all freedoms, including freedom of expression in 
article 43. As shall be discussed, the limitation in article 43 is restricted to non 
prejudicial interference with other fundamental freedoms and the public interest. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
23Henry Odimbe Ojambo, Reflections on Freedom of Expression in Uganda’s Fledgling Democracy. Sedition, 
“Pornography” and Hate Speech. Human Rights and Peace Centre Working Paper No. 18, 2008. 
huripec.mak.ac.ug/pdfs/working_paper_18.pdf 
24
 Chapter Four, pg. 39. 
25
 Id. pg. 46. 
26
 Per US Supreme Court decision in Thornhill v Alabama (310 US 88, Pgs. 101-102). 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
 
4.0. WHY JUDICIAL REVIEW IS AN EFFECTIVE TOOL FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION IN UGANDA 
(a) Introduction 
In as far as interpreting the constitution is concerned, judicial review is the power 
of judges to interpret the constitution and to refuse to acknowledge and therefore 
enforce those measures that in the opinion of court conflict with the spirit of the 
Constitution. 
In light of the fundamental right in question, the Constitution now empowers a 
person to challenge the constitutionality of an Act of Parliament where the person 
believes that the Act is in breach of a constitutional right. A claim for judicial 
review under article 137 (3) will usually be an appropriate procedure for enabling a 
person to enforce his constitutional right to freedom of expression. 
It will be shown that the application for judicial review is not only relevant but it 
has been effective by ensuring that Acts of Parliament do not infringe on the 
enjoyment of the freedom of expression. 
 
(b) Analysis: 
(i) Charles Onyango Obbo and Andrew Mwenda v Attorney General, 
Constitutional Petition No. 15 of 199727  
In this case, the Editor and reporters of the Monitor Newspaper were prosecuted 
under section 50 of the Penal Code Act28 for publishing false news when they 
published an article alleging that the President of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo paid Uganda in gold for services Uganda rendered to the struggle to oust 
Mobutu Sese Seko, a former military dictator of Congo. The journalists petitioned 
the constitutional court under article 137 challenging the constitutionality of 
section 50 which made it a criminal offence to publish false news. They lost the 
                                                          
27
 www.ulii.org/ug/judgment/constitutional-court/2000/4 (Obbo case) 
28
 Laws of Uganda, vol 8 Chapter 120. www.ugandaonlinelawlibrary.net 
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case because the constitutional court decided unanimously that the Director of 
Public Prosecution’s (DPP) action in prosecuting the appellants was not 
inconsistent with the Constitution, and by majority of four to one, that section 50 
was not inconsistent with article 29 (1) (a) of the Constitution and accordingly 
dismissed the petition. 
The petitioners then appealed to the Supreme Court29 seeking among other things 
declarations- 
(a) That the action of the DPP in prosecuting them under section 50 was 
inconsistent with articles 29 (1) (a) and (e), 40 (2) and 43 (2) (c) of the 
Constitution; and 
(b) That section 50 was inconsistent with articles 29 (1) (a) and (b), 40 (2) and 
43 (2) (c) of the Constitution. 
 
The fundamental freedom that was alleged to have been breached was the right to 
freedom of expression…. .30 This freedom is declared in article 29 as follows: 
 
“29. Protection of freedom of……….. expression, ……... 
 
(1) Every person shall have the right to— 
(a)  freedom of speech and expression which shall include freedom of the press 
and other media;…….” 
 
This freedom is also recognised and protected by many international conventions 
and declarations.31 
 
The freedom of expression is important in a democratic society. It is one of the 
fundamental freedoms pertaining to the citizen as a human being. Cassin R said in 
Man and Modern State that “no one has the power to control his internal thoughts 
and feelings or to prevent him from outwardly expressing his thoughts and 
feelings. Moreover freedom of objection and discussion is the one surest sources of 
truth.”32  
 
                                                          
29
 Constitutional Appeal No. 2 of 2002. www.ulii.org/ug/judgement/supreme-court/2004/1. 
30
 as well as the freedom of association and economic rights. 
31
 European Convention on Human Rights. http://www.hri.org/docs/ECHR.50.html  
32
 Judgment of Odoki JSC pg. 2. 
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Although the Constitution does not define what constitutes the freedom of 
expression, it is generally accepted that “the freedom of expression entails the 
freedom to hold opinions and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of 
all kinds, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art or through other 
chosen media without inference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.”33    
 
Indeed the Constitution requires the State, in its National Objectives and Directive 
Principles of State Policy No. V, to guarantee and respect institutions which are 
charged by the State with responsibility for protecting and promoting human rights 
by providing them with adequate resources to function effectively. 
 
This freedom enables the public to receive information and ideas which are 
essential for them to participate in their governance and protect the values of 
democratic government on the basis of the decisions. It further promotes a market 
place of ideas and it enables those in government or authority to be brought to 
public scrutiny and thereby hold them accountable.34   
 
The sole ground of appeal to the Supreme Court was against the majority decision 
of the constitutional court that section 50 was not inconsistent with article 29(1) (a) 
of the Constitution. It should be noted that the power vested in the constitutional 
court by article 137 (3) to review the constitutionality of an Act of Parliament is 
intended to ensure that the court can intervene to correct any excess or abuse that 
may be occasioned by Parliament in the exercise of its legislative power. However, 
that power is restricted to reviewing legislation and does not include review of 
legislative proposals before they become law. The constitutional court has a 
number of times refused to exercise this power when it has been asked to review 
bills before Parliament.35  
 
Section 50 provided that: 
 
                                                          
33Id article 19 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights 
(www.ohcr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx) and article 10 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights.  
34
 The Supreme Court of Zimbabwe emphasised the special objectives that freedom of expression serves in 
democracy in Mark Gova Chavunduka and Another v The Minister of Home Affairs and Another, Supreme 
Court Civil Application No. 156 of 1999. 
35
 Matembe and others v Attorney General, Constitutional Petition No. 2 of 2005 East African Law Reports, 2005 
Volume 2. The constitutional court was asked to stop Parliament from debating the Constitution (Amendment) 
Bill, No.2 of 2005. LawAfrica Publishing (U) Ltd.  Accessed on 14/06/2013.  
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“(1) Any person who publishes any false statement, rumour or report which is 
likely to cause fear and alarm to the public or to disturb the public peace commits 
a misdemeanour. 
 
  (2) It shall be a defence to a charge under subsection (1) if the accused proves 
that prior to publication, he or she took such measures to verify the accuracy of 
such statement, rumour or report as to lead him or her reasonably to believe that it 
was true.” 
 
The Supreme Court declared that section 50 was unconstitutional because it was 
too vague, wide, making it difficult to determine its scope and conjectural to 
provide the necessary certainty required to impose a restriction on freedom of 
expression. 
Mulenga JSC stated that the objective and effect of section 50 was, from the 
wording of the provision, “to provide a legal safeguard against the spreading of 
news, rumours or reports that could destabilize the populace with the probable 
effect of undermining the authority of the colonial regime.”36 Therefore a person 
who publishes a statement, rumour or report, which the prosecution holds out to be 
false or likely to cause public fear or alarm, or a disturbance of public peace, is 
liable to criminal prosecution and to imprisonment if convicted. 
  
The substance of the criticism of section 50 by the Supreme Court was that section 
was too vague and imprecise for a penal legislation. The learned Justices agreed 
with the appellants that the criticism was valid. 
 
The court observed that the section contains many words which are so vague that it 
is difficult to assign them any precise meaning. The court pointed out that: 
 
1. The word “publish” is not defined in the Act. Yet the word is capable of a 
variety of meanings. 
 
2. The word “false” has no definite meaning attached to it. 
 
3. “Statement”- what amounts to a statement? Is it a phrase, paragraph or 
sentence? 
                                                          
36
 Judgment of Mulenga JSC pg. 20. 
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4. “Public” - what does the word refer to? Is it a community, a section of the 
community or a handful of it? Is it as perceived by government or does it have 
an objective assessment? 
 
5. “Fear” and “alarm” to the public - How does fear manifest itself? 
 
6. “Likely” to cause fear. How is the likelihood of causing fear to be determined? 
 
 
This criticism raises the issues of clarity and precision and the drafting of penal 
provisions, in legislation. G.C. Thornton37 states that clarity in the legislative 
context requires simplicity and precision. He warns that neither concept must be 
sacrificed at the altar of the other. “What is simple will often be precise, and what 
is precise will often be simple but that one does not follow from the other.” 
 
Furthermore, Thornton states that the purposes of legislation are most likely to be 
expressed and communicated successfully by the drafter who is ardently concerned 
to write clearly and to be intelligible. The obligation to be intelligible, to convey 
the intended meaning so that it is comprehensible and easily understood, in other 
words to communicate successfully, requires the unremitting pursuit of clarity by 
drafters. 
Mulenga JSC38 echoed the warning by Thornton when he stated that “precision and 
clarity in the definition of a criminal offence is essential, if a person accused of the 
offence is to have a fair trial”. The court observed that in defining any derogation 
of a right guaranteed by the Constitution, precision and clarity are of essence. 
Therefore for a drafter to succeed in communicating law to its audience he must 
have the quality of precision. He must have precision in thought, so as to be able to 
see all legal implications of the policy to be given effect and he must have 
precision in language so as to be able to express the policy accurately. 
 
Thornton39 states that “penal provisions never stand alone; they form part of the 
wider criminal law and that must never be disregarded. They are subject to 
                                                          
37
 Legislative Drafting 4th edn Butterworths London 1996, pg. 52. 
38
 Id at pg. 4. 
39
 Ibid pg. 349 
13 
 
restrictive construction and the benefit of doubt in case of possible alternative 
construction will be given to the accused.” 
There are three elements in a penal provision.40 For all the three elements to be 
communicated effectively for a penal provision, they should be drafted in clear, 
precise and unambiguous terms. With these attributes in mind, certainty in 
legislation will be achieved.41 The learned Justices observed correctly that section 
50 was, according to these requirements not drafted with clarity and precision in 
mind. 
 
The court, in deciding the case as it did, considered the issue of limitation of the 
exercise of the freedom of expression and noted that although the Constitution 
guarantees the freedom of expression, that freedom is not absolute; it is therefore 
subject to certain restrictions to ensure that it is exercised responsibly.  Limitations 
may be imposed on the freedom which strike a balance between State involvement 
in the press and media autonomy as well as between freedom of expression and the 
press and other basic rights and social interests protected by law. 
 
Article 4342 provides for the general limitation on fundamental and other human 
rights and freedoms. It stipulates that: 
“(1) In the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms prescribed in this Chapter, no 
person shall prejudice the fundamental or other human rights and freedoms of 
others or the public interest. 
 
(2) Public interest under this article shall not permit— 
     (a) political persecution; 
 
     (b) detention without trial;  
 
     (c) any limitation of the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms prescribed by this 
Chapter beyond what is acceptable and demonstrably justifiable in a free 
and democratic society, or what is provided in this Constitution.” 
 
One of the questions that the court had to consider was whether the limitation 
imposed by section 50 fell within the ambit of article 43. For this to be determined, 
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two conditions would have had to be fulfilled namely: the limitation must be 
directed to prevent or remove “prejudice to the public interest” (sub article 1) and 
it must be a measure that is “acceptable and demonstrably justifiable in a free and 
democratic society” (sub article 2). The court stated that protection of guaranteed 
rights is the primary objective of the Constitution and that limiting their enjoyment 
is the exception to their protection. 
 
The Supreme Court of India, elaborating on the issue of limitation on the freedom 
of expression, held43 that  
“There does indeed have to be a compromise between the interest of freedom of 
expression and social interest. But we cannot simply balance the two interests as if 
they were of equal weight. Our commitment to the freedom of expression demands 
that it cannot be suppressed unless the situations created by allowing the freedom 
are pressing and the community interest is endangered. The anticipated danger 
should not be remote, conjectural or farfetched. It should be proximate and have 
direct nexus with the expression. The expression of thought should be intrinsically 
dangerous to the public interest…..” 
 
In other words the constitutional proviso in article 43 which sets the standard for 
the justifiability of any limitation on fundamental rights as being “acceptable and 
demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society,” cannot abused. The 
Canadian case of R v Oakes44 illustrates that in order for any limitation of freedom 
of expression to be accepted as legitimate it must be precise, narrow, and with 
clear objectives. Accordingly, the Crown must establish that the limitation serves a 
pressing and substantial objective and that the Crown must show a rational 
connection between the provision and its objective, that the section minimally 
impairs the right of the freedom concerned and that the effects of the section are 
proportional to its underlying objective. 
 
The Oakes test was cited in Obbo’s case with approval. The court in the Obbo case 
went on to specifically adopt the approach stated in the Zimbabwean case of Mark 
Gova & Another v Minister of Home Affairs,45 which has a similar but differently 
stated criteria for the justification of any law imposing limitation on guaranteed 
rights, as follows: 
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“(a) the legislative objective which the limitation is designed to promote must be 
sufficiently important to warrant overriding a fundamental right; 
 
(b) the measures designed to meet the objective must be rationally connected to it 
and not arbitrary, unfair or based on irrational considerations, and 
 
(c) the means used to impair the right or freedom must be no more than necessary 
to accomplish the objective.” 
 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court declared that section 50 did not fall within the 
ambit of article 43 and was therefore null and void. 
 
The declaration illustrates the effectiveness of judicial review as a safeguard for 
protecting the freedom of expression because section 50 which created the offence 
of publishing false news was struck out by the Supreme Court as being inconsistent 
with the right to freedom of expression under the Constitution. 
The Supreme Court observed that constitutional declaration of the freedom of 
expression in article 29 has a wide scope and yet the statute, namely the Penal 
Code Act is narrow in its definition of the offence. 
 
The effect of the declaration by the court speaks to the need to reform the laws 
affecting the freedom of expression in Uganda including the Penal Code Act in 
order to bring them into conformity with the Constitution. The court stated that 
section 50 
 
(a) does not stipulate or specify what a person is free to say or express; 
  
(b) does not provide a definition of “freedom of expression” or of the “press”; 
 
(c) the offence does not also describe the scope of the freedom. The court 
declared that the “right to freedom of expression extends to holding, 
receiving and imparting all forms of opinions, ideas and information.” 46  
 
The court provided a wider definition of the freedom of expression and declared 
that the freedom is not confined to categories, such as correct opinions, sound ideas 
or truthful information. A persons’ expression or statement is not precluded from 
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the constitutional protection simply because it is thought by another to be false, 
erroneous, controversial or unpleasant. 
Mulenga JSC47 stated that the probable reason for the retention of the Penal Code 
Act, particularly section 50 subsequent to the colonial administration is that the 
process of law reform has not been vigorous or extensive enough to review the 
relevance of laws in the changed circumstances. It was not clear why such a 
provision was still on the statute book at the time of making this decision. 
 
Since section 50 did not fall within the description of the purposes for which 
limitation on enjoyment of rights is permissible under article 43 (1) the effect of 
this decision is that the provision ought to be repealed from the statute book. The 
repeal of such a provision and many others is the role of the Uganda Law Reform 
Commission.48 
 
According to Chinery-Hesse,49 “following the enactment of the 1995 Constitution 
and indeed the declaration by the Supreme Court in 2004, the government should 
have undertaken a comprehensive reform of the laws of Uganda including laws 
affecting the enjoyment of the freedom of expression in order to bring them into 
conformity with the Constitution however progress on reform of laws is very 
slow”. The slow progress might be caused by the cost implications of reform and 
different government priorities.  
  
 
(ii) Muwanga Kivumbi v Attorney General, Constitutional Petition No. 
9 of 2005.50 (Kivumbi case) 
 
The petitioner was a member and coordinator of an organisation called the Popular 
Resistance against Life Presidency. In 2005, the organisation wrote letters to the 
authority namely the Minister of Internal Affairs and the Police seeking permission 
to hold political rallies in different parts of the country. In all these letters the 
police responded in the negative stating that the organisation was not registered 
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and that the planned rallies were illegal and indeed during one of the rallies, the 
police dispersed it and arrested the organisations members. 
 
The police justified the decision not to grant permission to conduct the rallies by 
relying on sections 32, 34 and 35 of the Police Act51 and the now repealed article 
73 of the Constitution. 
A petition was filed under article 137 (3) of the Constitution challenging the 
constitutionality of section 32 of the Police Act. The petitioner's case was that 
section 32 (2) contravened articles 20 (1), (2), 21 (1), (2), 29 (1) (a) (b) (d) (e), 38 
(2), 42 (1) and 43 (2) (a) and (c) of the Constitution.52  
The fundamental rights that were alleged to have been breached were the freedom 
of expression and assembly. It will be observed that these freedoms were dealt 
with in the same petition because they are related. The petitioners intended to 
assemble by conducting rallies in order to express themselves on matters that they 
believed were unconstitutional. Article 29 (1) (d) specifically provides for the 
“freedom to assemble and to demonstrate together with others peacefully and 
unarmed and to petition”. 
Like the freedom of expression, the freedom of assembly was protected under the 
1962 independence Constitution53 and the 1967 Constitution54 as well as the 
current Constitution.  
In this case, the measure employed by the court was to declare that section 32 (2) 
of the Police Act was inconsistent with and contravened articles 20 (1) and (2) and 
29 (1) (d) of the Constitution and were therefore null and void. 
In employing the measure, the court determined the following issues in the 
petition- 
(a) Whether section 32 of the Police Act contravenes articles 20 (1), (2), 21 (1), 
(2), 29 (1) (a) (b) (d) (e), 38 (2), 42 (1), 43 (2) (a)  and (c); 
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(b) Whether the police under section 32 have power to disperse lawful 
assemblies.  
Section 32 of the Police Act provided that: 
“(1) Any officer in charge of police may issue orders for the purpose of— 
 
       (a) regulating the extent to which music, drumming or a public address system 
may be used on public roads or streets or at occasion of festivals or 
ceremonies; 
 
     (b) directing the conduct of assemblies and processions on public roads or 
streets or at places of public resort and the route by which and the times at 
which any procession may pass. 
 
(2) If it comes to the knowledge of the inspector general that it is intended to 
convene any assembly or form any procession on any public road or street or at 
any place of public resort, and the inspector general has reasonable grounds for 
believing that the assembly or procession is likely to cause a breach of the peace, 
the inspector general may, ……………………………….. prohibit the convening of 
the assembly or forming of the procession.” 
 
Subsection (2) poses questions on clarity and ambiguity in legislative provisions. 
For example, the court determined that the operative word in this subsection was 
“prohibit”. The ordinary meaning of the word is to forbid someone from doing 
something.55 The context in which the word “prohibit” was used is contrary to the 
purposes of article 29 (1) (d). Also, how the likelihood of causing a breach of the 
peace is to be determined is not provided. 
 
For the petitioner to have succeeded in his petition, he had to prove that the powers 
given to the Inspector General of Police contravened the articles of the 
Constitution mentioned above and the respondent had to prove that the prohibition 
was demonstrably justifiable in a democratic society.56  
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The right to freedom of assembly and to demonstrate together with others in a 
peaceful manner is a fundamental right guaranteed under article 29 (1) (d) of the 
Constitution. As long as there is no contravention of article 43 of the Constitution 
and the rights are exercised within the confines of the law. The court found that 
there was no justification for invoking the powers under section 32 (2) of the 
Police Act. Therefore there was no convincing reason for restricting or stopping 
convening rallies or assembly or demonstration. Thus to uphold section 32 (2) as 
authorising the police to prohibit assemblies including public rallies or 
demonstration would be unconstitutional. 
The declaration that section 32 (2) is null and void was effective in that it enables 
the citizens to enjoy their fundamental freedoms under the said article without state 
intrusion. 
The effect of the declaration on legislative reform is that the ruling created a 
legislative gap in the management of assemblies and public gatherings, making it 
difficult for the police to maintain law and order and to preserve peace at public 
gatherings and events. The gap created by the annulment has consequently given 
rise to the need to analyse the Penal Code Act and the Police Act on the right to 
assemble in light of the need to regulate the conduct of public assemblies or 
meetings. 
Section 32(1) (b) gives the police the powers mentioned in that subsection but the 
provision does not require an organizer of an assembly or procession to notify the 
police of the intention to hold the assembly or procession. This is a challenge to 
maintaining law and order because without the information an intended assembly 
or procession or its location, the police will not have the opportunity to exercise the 
power given under that section. This therefore renders the section redundant. 
The powers given the under section 32 are prohibitive and not regulatory. They 
cannot, as was pointed out57 be justifiable in the circumstances of the petition. 
While it is the constitutional duty of the police to maintain law and order, with the 
annulment of section 32 (2) the police no longer has the power to regulate the 
conduct of assemblies or processions in public places where- 
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(a)  Two meetings are scheduled by the organizers to take place on the same 
date, at the same time and at the same venue, which is likely to cause 
disorder or pose a breach of peace; or 
(b) The venue is considered unsuitable for the purposes of crowd and traffic 
control or will interfere with other lawful business of non participants. 
The section is silent on- 
(a)  The procedure that the police should follow in the exercise of its powers 
under section 32 (1) (b); 
(b) The procedure that the organiser of an assembly should follow, such as 
notification by the organiser to the police of the intention to hold an 
assembly or procession; and  
(c)  The procedure that the participants in assemblies and processions should 
follow, in order to ensure that processions and assemblies do not take place 
in a lawless manner. 
 
The section is silent on duties and responsibilities of the police, the organiser and 
the participant at an assembly or procession. From the foregoing, there are no 
specific guidelines or procedure to help the police, organisers and participants in 
ensuring that assemblies take place in as disciplined a manner as possible and in 
accordance with reasonable standards. 
 
The declaration by the court forced the government to review section 35 (1) of the 
Police Act, which is another attempt at providing for regulation of assemblies 
under the law. The section empowers the Minister of Internal Affairs to declare an 
area a gazette area, where the Minister is of the opinion that it is desirable to do so 
in the interest of tranquility. 
 
A reading of the section suggests that it is too restrictive and does not facilitate the 
exercise of the freedom given under article 29 (1) (d). Similar to section 32 (1) (b), 
section 35 is inadequate in terms of procedural requirements that have to be 
fulfilled in order to conduct a public meeting, the duties and responsibilities of the 
police, the organiser and participant at an assembly or procession. 
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In relation to the Police (Amendment) Act, 200658 there is still inadequacy in those 
provisions regarding the managing of public order under the Police Act. The 
provisions relate to criminalising unpeaceful and unlawful gatherings rather than 
govern peaceful demonstrations or gatherings. 
 
Sections 65 - 74 of the Penal Code Act prohibit and criminalise unlawful 
assemblies and riots. While holding an unlawful assembly attracts one year’s 
imprisonment, participation in a riot is a misdemeanor punishable by two years’ 
imprisonment. 
 
These provisions are punitive and purposely prohibit unlawful assemblies and 
processions in public places. The adversarial and punitive nature of the provisions 
of the Penal Code Act does not facilitate the exercise of the right under article 29 
(1) (d). 
 
In view of the declaration of the court, the First Parliamentary Counsel advised that 
amending the Penal Code Act to cater for procedural matters would not be the 
appropriate way of facilitating the exercise of the freedom to assemble and 
demonstrate together with others peacefully and unarmed and to petition under 
article 29 (1) (d). Cabinet then approved the drafting of an independent legislation 
to regulate the conduct of public meetings and manage public order.59  
 
As such, the Public Order Management Bill, 201160 was drafted and is awaiting 
presidential assent. The purpose of this Bill is to prescribe measures for 
safeguarding public order without compromising the principles of democracy and 
freedom of expression and association in accordance with article 43. It is intended 
that the proposed Bill will provide for the procedure to be followed in conducting 
peaceful demonstration, assembly or holding a public meeting, supplement the 
existing law and regulate public meetings. It would also facilitate peace and 
tranquility in society at all times. The Bill apportions responsibility to organisers of 
assemblies, participants and the police before, during and after assembly so that 
there is accountability for every commission and omission by all persons envisaged 
by the Bill. This will promote unfettered enjoyment of the participant’s 
fundamental rights without compromising the public interest or interfering with the 
rights of third parties unconnected with the event.  
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Consequently, where individuals assemble, if the police entertain a reasonable 
belief that some disturbance might occur during the assembly, the Bill requires 
provision of security and supervision in anticipation of the disturbances. This is in 
line with the spirit of the articles of the Constitution that guarantee a right to 
peaceful demonstration, the Bill merely requires of the conveners of the assemblies 
an undertaking of good behavior at the processions. 
 
 
 
(iii) Andrew Mwenda and Another v Attorney General, Constitutional 
Petition No. 12 of 2005.61   
 
In this case, the first petitioner, a journalist by profession and a former manager of 
K.FM Radio 93.3 and political editor of the Monitor Newspaper petitioned the 
constitutional court under article 137 (3) seeking declarations of nullification of 
offences of sedition and promoting sectarianism preferred against him in the Chief 
Magistrates Court contending that the offences were unconstitutional. The second 
petitioner on its own in public interest also petitioned this court seeking 
declarations of nullification of the abovementioned offences as well as criminal 
defamation.62 
  
The fundamental freedom that was alleged to have been breached, like in the cases 
discussed above was the right to freedom of expression. The petitioners contended 
that criminally prosecuting the first petitioner under sections 39 and 40 of the Penal 
Code Act constituted inconsistencies with the Constitution under article 29 (1) and 
43 (2) (c). 
 
Section 39 and 40 speak about seditious intentions and the offence of sedition 
respectively. Ojambo63 states that “the objectives of Uganda’s sedition law are not 
quite clear” but that the provision was introduced into Uganda’s laws during the 
colonial era. 
 
Barendt64 in supporting the view in Arthur Nwankwo v The State65   noted that 
“The classic definition of sedition reflects a traditional, conservative view of the 
correct relationship between the state and society. Governments and public 
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institutions are not to be regarded as responsible to the people, but in some 
mystical way, as under the doctrine of the Divine Right of Kings, are entitled to the 
respect of their subjects.”66 Ojambo67 rightly observes that the world has since 
changed. “In a democratic dispensation, accountability on the part of the leadership 
to its subjects is a critical requirement.” He states that “it is through such 
accountability that the electorate can make informed decisions for purposes of 
casting their votes……….. leaders under a democratic dispensation cannot afford 
to shield themselves from adverse criticisms.”  
 
In Gooding v Wilson,68 the United States Supreme Court ruled that a criminal 
statute proscribing speech suffers unconstitutional overbreadth when the standards 
employed to convict create a real and substantial risk of punishing constitutionally 
protected conduct. Therefore sedition laws are not necessary in a democratic 
society if they stifle the constitutionally protected right to free expression.69  
 
The constitutional court declared that sections 39 and 40 were inconsistent with 
article 29 (1) (a) and 43 (2) (c) of the Constitution. 
 
Section 39 provides that: 
 
“(1) A seditious intention shall be an intention— 
 
(a)  to bring into hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection against the 
person of the President, the Government as by law established or the 
Constitution; 
 
(b) to excite any person to attempt to procure the alteration, otherwise than 
by lawful means, of any matter in state as by law established; 
 
(c) to bring into hatred or contempt or to excite disaffection against the 
administration of justice; 
 
(d) to subvert or promote the subversion of the Government or the 
administration of a district. 
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(2) For the purposes of this section, an act, speech or publication shall not be 
deemed to be seditious by reason only that it intends— 
 
(a) to show that the Government has been misled or mistaken in any of its 
measures; 
 
(b) to point out errors or defects in the Government or the Constitution or in 
legislation or in the administration of justice ……………………………. ; 
 
(c) to persuade any person to attempt to procure by lawful means the 
alteration of any matter as by law established. 
 
(3) ………….. , in determining whether the intention with which any act was done, 
any words were spoken or any document was published was or was not seditious, 
every person shall be deemed to intend the consequences which would naturally 
follow from his or her conduct at the time and in the circumstances in which he or 
she was conducting himself or herself.” 
 
Section 40 provides that: 
 
“(1) Any person who— 
 
(a) does or attempts to do or makes any preparation to do, or  conspires with 
any person to do, any act with a seditious intention; 
 
(b) utters any words with a seditious intention; 
 
(c) prints, publishes, sells, offers for sale, distributes or reproduces any 
seditious publication; 
 
(d) imports any seditious publication, unless he or she has no reason to 
believe, the proof of which shall lie on him or her, that it is seditious,  
 
commits an offence ……………………… 
 
   (2) Any person who, without lawful excuse, has in his or her possession any 
seditious publication commits an offence ………… 
 
  (3)…………………………. 
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 (4) It shall be a defence to a charge under subsection (2) that if the person 
charged did not know that the publication was seditious ………………. ” 
 
A reading of the decision in the Oake’s case suggests that section 40 does not 
present a known objective for limiting the freedom of expression.  
Counsel for the respondent argued that the law of sedition has the objective of 
maintaining the security of the state and so section 39 and 40 are intended to 
protect that objective. As such the limitations on the enjoyment of that freedom are 
justified. Although counsel argued that restrictions under such laws are not only in 
Uganda70 the question as was discussed in the Obbo case is whether the restrictions 
are demonstrably justifiable in a democratic society. The fact that many countries 
which are considered free and democratic are still retaining these sedition laws 
does not make them justifiable in a democratic society neither does it place them 
within the ambit of section 43(2). 
 
The petitioner is also said to have uttered words intended to bring into hatred or 
contempt or to excite disaffection against the person of the President, the 
Government as follows: 
 
“You see these African Presidents. This man went to University, why can’t he 
behave like an educated person? Why does he behave like a villager? 
 
Museveni can never intimidate me. He can only intimidate himself…… the 
President is becoming more of a coward …………………………. moving in tanks 
and mambas, you know hiding with a mountain of soldiers ……………..” 
 
Without a clear objective for limiting the freedom of expression, it is not clear if 
the utterances indeed breach the sections. Ojambo71 notes that “it is, for instance, 
dangerously misleading for one to assume that the public is readily willing to agree 
to any viewpoints expressed by people who are believed or known to identify with 
particular political ideologies or parties. For example, it would be foolhardy of 
anyone to expect the supporters of the ruling National Resistance Movement, to 
readily believe and take for the truth any claims made by those who are known or 
believed to belong to the different opposition parties.” 
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One of the fundamental criticisms that led to the declaration was that the wording 
creating the offence of sedition was so vague that one would not have known the 
boundary to stop at while exercising the right under article 29 (1) (a). The use of 
subjective terms such as ‘hatred,’ ‘contempt,’ ‘discontent,’ ‘feelings of ill-will and 
disaffection,’ without any definition, renders the provision too vague. This 
criticism like in the first case also raises the issue of uncertainty in legislation and 
in particular, penal provisions. 
 
Section 39 was said to be too vague to warrant an examination of “minimal 
impairment” principle.72 Speaking to the characteristic vagueness on the law of 
sedition, the Supreme Court of Canada articulately observed “as is frequently 
mentioned in the authorities, probably no crime has been left in such vagueness of 
definition as that with which we are here concerned.”73 
  
Furthermore on limiting the freedom of expression, section 40 is extremely 
disproportionate. The Oake’s case, cited with approval in the Obbo case74 
articulates the test for determination of the proportionality of a limitation to 
fundamental freedoms. 
 
The measure adopted by the court was effective in that sections 39 and 40 of the 
Penal Code Act were declared to be inconsistent with provisions of the articles 29 
(1) (a) and 43 (2) (c) of the Constitution and were therefore null and void. They 
were thus struck out of that Act. 
 
The measure highlights the issue of penal provisions in legislation and legislative 
objective discussed earlier. A penal provision should state the objective and 
subjective elements of the offence including the act, omission, conduct and factual 
element and intent and fault respectively.75 Therefore without a known legislative 
objective for sections 39 and 40, the penal provisions could not have achieved the 
certainty required of such provisions. 
 
                                                          
72
 Supra Oakes case at 43. 
73
 Boucher v The King [1951] SCR 265 at 294.  
74
 Mulenga at pg. 20. 
75Helen Xanthaki, Legislative Drafting Lecture Notes Week- Penal Provisions. 
http://studyonline.sas.ac.uk/course/view/php?id) Pg. 5. 
27 
 
As far as legislative reform is concerned, it is apparent that following the 
enactment of the Constitution in 1995, several laws or provisions particularly those  
that affected fundamental rights and freedoms including the Penal Code Act would 
either be inconsistent or in contravention with the Constitution. As such the 
framers of the Constitution thought it necessary to make provision for existing law 
to the effect that existing law would be “construed with such modifications, 
adaptations, qualifications and exceptions as may be necessary to bring it into 
conformity”76 with the Constitution. 
 
Another effect of the decision of the court on legislative reform relates to 
proportionality in regulation of fundamental freedoms. Clarity in the law and 
justifiable objective regulation are as critical as the effect of measures chosen to 
ensure such limitation or regulation.77 The statute books therefore need to be 
reformed to reflect the decision of the court namely to expunge the null and void 
and redundant provisions. 
As a result of the declaration, sections 42, 43 and 44 of the Penal Code which 
related to sedition were declared redundant. 
In Surek and Ozdemir v. Turkey78 the European Court of Human Rights ruled that 
the government must always exercise restraint in resorting to criminal proceedings 
particularly where other means are available for replying to unjustified attacks and 
criticisms of its adversaries.” Accordingly, any measure taken by a government to 
restrict freedom of expression must be exercised with extreme restraint largely 
because of the power imbalance characteristic of the two. 
The cases above illustrate the challenges with the existing legal provisions in the 
laws affecting the freedom of expression namely the Penal Code Act and the Police 
Act to legal reform. However with the declarations by the courts, legal reform 
efforts should now be vigorously pursued. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
5.0. OVERVIEW OF LEGISLATIVE REFORMS RELATING TO THE 
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
(a) Historical background 
Pre-colonial Uganda indicates that the right to freedom of expression was 
restricted. The political systems then in place did not and in the circumstances 
could not leave such a freedom unrestricted.79 Indeed the courts in the colonial 
days were strict and called the press regularly to order.80 Since then however 
especially beginning with the case of Uganda v Rajat Neogy,81 the Uganda courts 
have been hostile to the government in sedition cases. 
The reform of the laws affecting the freedom of expression under the current 
Government was conceived in 1987 on the basis that there was need to update the 
various media laws in Uganda to reflect the political, economic and social 
conditions of the time and consolidate the laws into one comprehensive law. 
The media laws that affected the freedom of expression and in force at the time 
were (a) the Newspaper and Publications Act82, (b) the Newspaper and 
Publications (Amendment) Decree;83 (c) the Television (Licensing) Act84; (d) the 
Press Censorship and Correction Act,85 (e) the Penal Code Statute86; (f) the 
Cinematograph Act,87 and (g) the Stage Plays and Public Entertainments Act.88 
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(b) Policy Considerations 
 
The laws in force at the time suggest that the government’s policy considerations 
for reforming the laws were to streamline, update and consolidate all the laws 
hitherto related to mass media. There was a need to provide an acceptable balance 
between the freedom of the media and protection of the public against defamation, 
libel and sedition. Recognition of journalism as a profession was also considered. 
The government thought it necessary to ensure that Uganda’s moral attitudes and 
values are respected and conformed to the media and provide an institutional 
framework for the supervision of the press namely, to establish a regulatory body. 
(c) The development of the proposed law 
A draft Bill was produced in July 1989, entitled the “Press and Publication Bill”. 
Under this Bill the requirement for registration of newspapers was maintained as 
contained in the Newspapers and Publications Act.89 In clause 1(1) of the Bill, an 
application for registration of a newspaper was required to contain the particulars 
of the editor, proprietor, publisher and printer, the title of the newspaper, the 
editorial policy of the newspaper and location of its head office. 
A registrar of newspapers was provided for, whose main duty was to maintain a 
register of newspapers in order to enter the particulars of all registered newspapers. 
The requirement for the compulsory registration of newspapers and their 
proprietorship was adopted from England where compulsory registration of 
newspapers was provided under the Newspaper Libel and Registration Act, 188190 
except for a newspaper owned by a company incorporated under the Companies 
Acts 1862-79. This requirement was imported into law under the Newspaper and 
Publications Act and retained in the Bill. 
The rationale for the registration of all types of media was to ensure accountability 
and to regulate ownership of media and its distribution in Uganda. 
The main features of this Bill included- 
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(a) prohibition of publications relating to the defence of Uganda (as 
previously provided under the Penal Code (Amendment) Act, 1988; 
(b) press control through the Press Control Board91; 
(c) establishment of a National Press Council; 
(d) registration of and issuance of practicing certificates to journalists; and 
(e) disciplinary measures to be taken against journalists in the enhancement 
of professionalism amongst journalists and disciplinary proceedings. 
It will be observed that the Bill was an extension to the Newspaper and Publication 
Act92 and mainly regulated print media. The novelty in the Bill was the 
institutional framework for the regulation of the press and its professionalism 
through the establishment of the Press Control Board and the National Press 
Council.  
The draft Press and Publication Bill, 1991 
The Bill sought to repeal and replace the Newspaper and Publication Act and the 
Press Censorship and Correction Act93 and to consolidate the various media laws 
into one Bill. It improved the zero draft Bill by- 
(a) reproducing in verbatim the Cinematograph Act under Parts VIII to XII of 
the Bill; 
 
(b) reproducing in Parts II to IV of the Bill, the Newspapers and Publications 
Act; 
 
(c) reproducing in Part V, the Press Censorship and Correction Act; 
 
(d) reproducing in Part VII the penal provisions relating to the press in the Penal 
Code (Amendment) Act, 1988; and  
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(e) reproducing in Part XIII, the Television (Licensing) Act. 
The draft Mass Media and Journalists Bill, 1992 
This Bill sought to amend and consolidate the law relating to mass media with a 
view to streamlining and bringing it in line with Uganda’s political, economic and 
cultural and social conditions by, in part, repealing the Newspaper and Publications 
Act, the Press Censorship and Correction Act, the Cinematograph Act and the 
Television (Licensing) Act.  
Following the recommendations of the Uganda Journalists’ Association on the 
proposed Bill in 1991, most of the provisions on the payment of bonds, press 
control and censorship, penal provisions on publication of information prejudicial 
to security and publication of false news were removed. The basis of their removal 
was that the provisions were inconsistent with the development of a free press and 
with the right to freedom of expression. 
In 1993, Cabinet adopted and approved the Mass Media and Journalists Bill, 1993 
subject to adjustments made by Cabinet Minute 185 (CT 1993) 21 July 1993. The 
Bill was then published in the Gazette as Bill No. 23 of 1993. 
Subsequently, in supplement No. 3 of the Gazette dated 25th February 1994, the 
Bill was republished with the insertion of a new provision on district censorship 
committees. 
(d) Parliamentary Stage. 
The Bill was formally tabled before the National Resistance Council (N.R.C) on 
the 1st April 1994. The 7th N.R.C session was prorogued before the Bill was read a 
second and third time. From April to September 1994, the Committee on Social 
Affairs of the N.R.C deliberated on the draft Bill and massively amended it on the 
basis of consultations it had with interested parties. 
The Bill was again tabled for the first reading in September 1994. However, the 
Bill that was re-tabled was essentially the product of the Social Affairs Standing 
Committee of the N.R.C. During the second reading of the Bill in November 1994, 
the N.R.C referred the Bill to a special Select Committee of the House after 
rejecting it on grounds that the Bill was “draconian”. 
32 
 
The Special Select Committee produced a report together with a redrafted Bill 
which was adopted by Parliament on 17th May 1995.94Among the various 
resolutions, recommendations and amendments made to the Bill were- 
 
(a) a resolution that the entire Bill be redrafted in order to realise the principle 
of freedom of the press, the recognition of journalism as a profession and 
provision of a free and responsible press;95 
 
(b) the Bill was refined to provide for the wider regulation of mass media rather 
than newspapers only and for the recognition of journalism as a profession; 
 
(c) it was recommended that a separate Bill establishing a coordinating body be 
provided specifically to cater for the fast changing technology in electronic 
media as well as to coordinate all aspects for broadcasting such as ethics and 
various international conventions to which Uganda is a signatory. 
The outcome of the report formed the basis for the formulation and subsequent 
enactment of the Electronic Media Statute of 199696 which repealed the 
Cinematograph Act, and the Television Licensing Act, the enactment of the Press 
and Journalist Statute 199597 catering for freedom of press and media council 
responsible for the regulation of mass media and the establishment of the National 
Institute of Journalists of Uganda. The Act repealed the Newspaper and 
Publications Act and the Press Censorship and Correction Act. 
Penal Code Act98 
The Penal Code Act, a law of general application, is one of those laws that has 
been vigorously enforced by the Government. For example, under section 34, the 
Minister of Internal Affairs has the power to prohibit the importation of 
publications in public interest. Publication of information prejudicial to security is 
prohibited under section 37. The publication of seditious matter was a criminal 
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offence under sections 39 and 40 discussed above. Section 41 prohibits any person 
from printing or publishing sectarian material. Under section 42, the courts have 
power to authorise confiscation of offending printing presses and to prohibit 
seditious publications. 
Chapter XVII- creates the offences of criminal defamation and libel against private 
persons. 
The Press and Journalist Act99 
This Act extended article 29 (1) of the Constitution to the print media. It created 
the Media Council, the National Institute of Journalists of Uganda and a 
disciplinary committee within the media council. The council is responsible for 
regulating eligibility for media ownership and requires journalists to register with 
the National Institute of Journalists of Uganda. 
  
Section 3 of the Act requires compliance with other laws and prohibits any 
publication which improperly infringes on the privacy of an individual or which 
contains false information. 
As a regulatory measure, a proprietor of mass media organisation is required, 
under section 5, on appointing an editor, to register with the council the particulars 
of the editor as spelt out in sections 6 and 7. 
To promote mutual co-existence between the State and the press, the council is 
empowered under section 9 (1) (b) (ii) to arbitrate disputes between the State and 
the media. The council is also empowered to censor films, videotapes, plays and 
other related apparatus for public consumption and to promote morality. 
The Electronic Media Act100 
The objective of this Act was to establish a broadcasting council for the purpose of 
licensing and regulating the electronic media.  
 
The Act provided for the registration of television and radio stations and 
established the Broadcasting Council to co-ordinate and exercise control over and 
supervise broadcasting activities, among other things. 
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The legal provisions in the Penal Code Act, the Press and Journalists Act and the 
Electronic Media Act provide a mechanism for controlling the press freedom. The 
law of defamation101 is available for individuals to institute criminal or civil suits 
for the publication of defamatory matter. There is no express right for the State to 
directly proscribe the publication of any matter by the media save for imported 
publications. 
 
The Uganda Communications Act, 2013102  
 
This Act consolidates and harmonises the Uganda Communications Act103 and the 
Electronic media Act.104 It dissolves the Uganda Communications Commission and 
the Broadcasting Council and reconstitutes them as one body known as the Uganda 
Communications Commission. The main objective of this Act is to develop the 
communications sector by establishing a regulatory body for communications.  
 
(e)  Analysis of reform efforts 
 
While Uganda has endeavored to reform its media laws mainly to give effect to the 
Constitution, it is apparent that some laws still infringe on the freedom of 
expression as seen by the numerous petitions to the constitutional court seeking 
declarations that Acts of Parliament including the Penal Code Act and the Police 
Act infringe on the enjoyment of the freedom as declared under article 29. 
Government had argued that one of the effects of Electronic Media Act, now 
repealed and the Press and Journalist Act was to seriously weaken government as a 
regulatory arm over the media. These two laws repealed the media laws mentioned 
earlier except the Penal Code Act. Consequently in relation to newspapers, there is 
no requirement to register anywhere, the office of the Registrar of newspapers was 
abolished, government deprived itself of the power to proscribe or ban offensive 
newspapers, an administrative media council was set up with the power to issue 
practicing certificates to journalists but not to licence newspapers and a mild code 
of conduct for journalists and a feeble sanctions regime is in place.  
The issue under the Electronic Media Act was that although the broadcasting 
council was established to coordinate, control and supervise radio stations, 
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television stations and any broadcasting apparatus, its main role, namely of issuing 
licenses was lacking because the council could issue operating licences to 
electronic media however there was no power stipulated to revoke these licenses.  
According to B. Jones and K. Thompson105 “specified activities are subjected to 
some form of governmental control. This is usually, but not always, primarily in 
order to enforce or maintain standards.” Conditions may exist both as to standards 
that must be satisfied before a licence is issued and as to the manner in which the 
particular activity may subsequently be carried under the terms of the licence.106 
This problem has now been resolved by the enactment of the Uganda 
Communications Act.107 
 
Some critics argue that “it is highly possible that the apparent blossoming of the 
media industry is largely driven by economic considerations rather than the true 
and legitimate objective of the media – the advancement of social goals through 
the sharing of information.”108  
 
What the above overview means in terms of judicial review as a safeguard for 
protecting the freedom of expression is: 
 
1. Ample regard to the Constitution must be the paramount factor for achieving a 
meaningful transformation of the legal regime on freedom of expression. 
 
2. Democratic societies uphold and protect fundamental rights and freedoms 
essentially on principles that are in line with JJ Rousseau’s version of the Social 
Contract theory.109  Uganda acknowledges this theory in article 20 of the 
Constitution which speaks about fundamental and other human rights and 
freedoms. However the decisions of the courts provide a stark reminder to the 
government to effectively fulfill its obligations to its citizens particularly with 
regard to protection and promotion of fundamental rights and freedoms. 
 
3. A number of archaic and restrictive media laws have been repealed and 
replaced with progressive ones including the Press and Journalists Act. It will 
be recalled that provisions that were inconsistent with the development of a free 
press and with the right to freedom of expression were removed from the Press 
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and Journalist Act but not in the Penal Code Act. This led to the petitions for 
judicial review to the constitutional court and the decision of the Supreme Court 
which declared those provisions null and void and redundant. 
 
The power vested in the constitutional court to review the constitutionality of an 
Act of Parliament ensures that the court can intervene to correct any excess or 
abuse that may be occasioned by Parliament in the exercise of its legislative 
power. The analysis of the cases above however suggests that the laws in 
question particularly the Penal Code Act and the Police Act need to be reformed 
in accordance with the Constitution. The constitutional court can only intervene 
to invoke its powers under article 137 if a person alleges that his fundamental 
right or freedom is breached. 
 
4. While the decisions of the constitutional court in its judicial review role are 
critical in assessing the constitutionality and legitimacy of legislation, the court 
is not a very effective yardstick for the executive and especially for the drafter 
because not every Act of Parliament is subjected to review by the constitutional 
court. Indeed while in Uganda the volume of legislation as described above has 
been increasing, the constitutional cases relating to those laws have not been 
moving in tandem.110 
 
5. The new and emerging challenges fuelled by globalisation call for 
corresponding new prescriptions which have been partially addressed. A 
comprehensive reform of the statute books and revision of the relevant laws 
should be conducted with a view to providing prescriptions for the new social 
challenges relating to free expression without infringing on the constitutional 
protection. For example in the Kivumbi case, the proposal to licence 
newspapers is on all fours with the case against section 32(2) of the Police Act. 
Consequently, in all likelihood, the constitutional court will strike down and 
declare null and void any provisions inserted in the Press and Journalist Act 
requiring licensing for newspapers, the press and other media. 
 
6. Some scholars argue in relation to the functions of the media council111  that it 
is not a question of regulation of the media but how this regulation will be 
conducted.112 It is argued that the media council leaves a lot to be desired in the 
performance of its regulatory functions. The problem stems from the fact that 
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“the nature of the Uganda media council, for being an establishment of 
parliament, raises a question as to whether the media should regulate itself or be 
subjected to regulation by another entity established by Parliament. 
 
Governmental regulation is problematic because “the notion of governmental 
regulation of the media is that it tends to represent the authoritarian normative 
theory on media performance. It certainly rejects the social contract theory that 
entails self-regulation of the media.”113 Therefore Uganda can borrow a leaf 
from other democracies including Tanzania, Swaziland and Zambia where 
media regulation is largely recognised as an exclusive responsibility of the 
media itself in the exercise of its right to self regulation. In Swaziland, the 
Parliament rejected government attempts to establish a media council for the 
regulation of that country’s media.114  
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
 
6.0. LESSONS FOR THE DRAFTER, GOVERNMENT AND 
PARLIAMENT 
Unconstitutional laws or provisions in those laws create uncertainty in law. They 
are a legal anomaly as they oppose major principles of the law although they are 
subject to judicial review. Indeed they reflect the failure of the drafter in 
identifying the problem, the government in failing to prevent the draft from 
reaching Parliament and the Parliament from stopping the provision from 
becoming law. The rule of law requires certainty in law in respect of legitimacy 
and constitutionality.115 
The above discussion presents lessons as follows: 
(a) Drafter:  
 
It is well known that legislation is the main instrument by which many of the 
government policies are implemented. This is particularly so in developing 
countries such as Uganda which inherited colonial laws which have to be 
modernised to suit the changed circumstances including the need to promote the 
economy, legal and other developments requiring the regulation of rights and 
obligations of citizens. This obligation of government restates the importance of 
the role of the drafter in translating policy into legislation. 
 
The first lesson for the drafter is that constitutional questions are likely to arise 
from legislation concerned with fundamental rights and freedoms as civil rights 
standards. As such “all statutes should be drafted with a close reading of the 
constitution to ensure that a statute is not inconsistent with, or in contravention of, 
a provision of the constitution. Failure to do so will render the statute void ab 
initio.116 Chapter Four of the Constitution contains “rigidly entrenched provisions 
for the recognition, protection and promotion of fundamental and other human 
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rights and freedoms including the protection of freedom of conscience, expression, 
……... ”
117
 Section Q-b of the Uganda Public Service Standing Orders, 2010118 
requires the drafter to notify the law officers, namely the Solicitor General and the 
Attorney General if a proposed legislation infringes on the fundamental rights and 
freedoms of individuals. Accordingly, the drafter should ensure that legislation 
promotes and upholds these rights and requires agencies of government to also 
respect, uphold and promote these rights. 
  
Secondly, the drafter should concern himself with aspects of judicial review that 
must be remembered when for example, legislation is drafted to confer new powers 
on the government such as regulating the media.119 
 
Thirdly, a drafter should draft legislation in language that is clear and precise. The 
court in the Obbo case criticised the construction of section 50 as imprecise for a 
penal legislation. The court stated that precision and clarity in the definition of a 
criminal offence is essential, if a person accused of the offence is to have a fair 
trial. “Clarity and precision in drafting require specificity” and to achieve this, a 
drafter should learn to “devote special attention to writing their Bill’s detail in 
clearly stated legislative sentences that use words accurately”.120  
 
(b) Government:  
 
The first lesson for government is that the Executive authority is required to be 
exercised in accordance with the Constitution121 because it is the supreme law of 
the land.122 Therefore as a critical component of democratic governance, measures 
to restrict the media must be exercised with extreme restraint123 and that this right 
is constitutionally protected. Policies that affect fundamental rights and freedoms 
must be concisely written so that the rights of individuals are reconciled with the 
authority of the state. 
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Uganda like any other democratic society is committed to upholding the right to 
freedom of expression. That commitment and indeed adherence to democratic 
practices may not be as long standing as in the older democracies, but it is as real 
and it is for that reason that it is entrenched in the most binding instrument of the 
land. The Constitution guarantees to everyone in Uganda the right to freedom to 
hold opinions and to receive and impart ideas and information without 
interference. This commitment is stipulated not only in the Constitution but in the 
Press and Journalist Act which was enacted to ensure press freedom. 
Secondly, Government should employ alternative remedies for the protection of 
the reputation of public figures including suits in defamation and libel rather than 
invoking provisions of the law such as section 39 and 40 to deal with unfavorable 
comments or publications by the media. Although unconstitutional provisions are 
subject to judicial review and may be rectified, there is bound to be transitional 
issues to deal with thus resulting into a waste of resources. 
Thirdly with the media explosion and significant upsurge in constitutional 
litigation around media rights, the Government should put in place legislative 
mechanisms for protecting the freedom of expression rather than to suppress it. 
Although the legal regime is undergoing reform, Government has yet to learn from 
the constitutional and Supreme courts’ decisions and international best practices. A 
proposal by Cabinet in 2010124 to amend the Press and Journalist Act met with 
legal road blocks because it raises matters of constitutionality of the proposals for 
drafting of the Bill. One of the major proposals is to require a licence for anybody 
who wishes to operate a newspaper. It is intended that a person who publishes a 
newspaper without the necessary licence commits a criminal offence. This 
proposal certainly affects the constitutionally protected freedom of expression 
under article 29.  
 
Fourthly, the Government ought to devise a mechanism against the difficult act of 
balancing the public interest and individual rights. The starting point may well be 
the celebrated Supreme Court decision in the Obbo case “a ruling whose positive 
implications on the exercise and enjoyment of freedom of expression in Uganda 
will remain of considerable historical value.”125 
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(c) Parliament: 
 
The principle of conformity with the Constitution is found in the written 
constitutions of many countries. In Uganda, as the supreme law, the Constitution 
“specifies the limits to which powers are confined in order to protect individual 
rights and prevent the abusive exercise of arbitrary power.”126 The first lesson 
drawn for Parliament is that while the Constitution confers the legislative power of 
the state on a Legislature and empowers the legislature to make laws for the good 
order and good governance, it still remains the supreme law.127 Therefore, “a law 
passed by a Legislature which is not in consonance with the spirit and letter of the 
Constitution will be declared unconstitutional.”128 
  
Secondly, judicial review of legislation on constitutional grounds is now practiced 
in many countries. In the US constitutional case of Marbury v. Madison, Chief 
Justice Marshall rejected the idea that the courts must close their eyes to the 
Constitution when upholding the doctrine of Parliamentary supremacy.129 It will be 
observed in this case that the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall, while examining 
parliamentary supremacy and judicial review against the US Constitution, holds 
true for countries with a written constitution that imposes limitations on the power 
of Parliament and allows the courts to examine all legislative acts to ensure their 
compatibility with the Constitution. The constitutional court has powers under 
article 137 to judicially strike down Acts of Parliament or provisions under those 
Acts as being inconsistent with the Constitution.  
 
Thirdly, while enacting legislation, Parliament should in relation to the Obbo case 
and with reference to section 50 address the question of substantial concern, which 
justifies a limiting legislation; to identify the strict objective of the legislation and 
to design the minimum measure and means for achieving that objective. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
7.0. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Judicial review is not only an integral part of the Constitution but is also a basic 
structure of the Constitution which cannot be whittled down by an amendment of 
the Constitution and the judiciary is the best placed government organ to 
implement judicial review. It is, as illustrated, a fundamental right in law. 
 
The 1962 and the 1967 Constitutions guaranteed fundamental rights and freedoms. 
Therefore, violation of human rights in post-independence Uganda was not solely 
due to weaknesses or absence of constitutional and other legal guarantees of those 
rights. It is because of the political turmoil that characterised Uganda that the 
Constitution was enacted to protect fundamental and other rights among other 
things. 
The fundamental task of the Constitution was to strengthen the enforcement 
institutions of human rights and to establish new ones which have been empowered 
to defend human rights.130 It guarantees all the rights as contained in major 
international declarations and covenants on the human rights to which Uganda is 
signatory including the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights.131 
In order to ensure that Acts of Parliament are enacted within the confines of the 
Constitution and specifically to ensure that fundamental rights and freedoms are 
protected, judicial review was entrenched in article 137 and as illustrated has been 
effectively applied to protect the freedom of expression.  
Accordingly, in exercising its legislative duty under article 79, Parliament should 
ensure that Acts which contravene fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals 
including the freedom of expression are not passed because the constitutional court 
shall invoke its power under article 137 to check the constitutionality of those 
Acts. 
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The government has consistently argued, in light of the several legislation enacted 
to regulate the media, that if the machinery of information has no guidance, 
security will be undermined, society will not be properly guided, government 
programmes will be derailed and development will not occur.  
 
In terms of protecting the freedom of expression in Uganda, the power of 
Government to regulate or control the media was not greatly diminished by the 
decisions of the courts or in the reformed legal framework including the repealed 
Electronic Media Act and the Press and Journalist Act. The reason for this is that 
protection of the fundamental human rights is a primary objective of every 
democratic constitution and as such is an essential characteristic of democracy. In 
particular, protection of the right of freedom of expression is of great significance 
to democracy. “It is the bedrock of democratic governance. Meaningful 
participation of the governed in their governance, which is the hall mark of 
democracy, is only assured through optimal exercise of freedom of expression”.132  
 
The fundamental rights and freedoms are entrenched in the Constitution and the 
enjoyment of those rights and freedoms can only be limited if they infringe on the 
rights of others or if they are justifiable in a free and democratic society. The 
proposal by government to require registration of newspapers for example would 
certainly be declared unconstitutional if it were to be enacted into law. 
 
To ensure that the freedom of expression is protected according to the Constitution 
and from a drafters’ perspective, the government should revisit the media laws and 
media policy. The government is enjoined to uphold the Constitution including the 
Bill of Rights in Chapter Four and in particular article 29. It is recommended 
therefore that the government policy on the media needs to be concisely stated.  A 
clear statement of the legislative objective would ensure questions discussed in the 
cases above do not arise. Further action with respect to the legal regime ought to be 
undertaken whether in the form of further regulation, deregulation, or a general 
review. The weaknesses of the regulatory mechanisms employed in the regulation 
of the media needs to be resolved.  
 
The above cases pose policy considerations which the government should clearly 
address including- 
 
(a) Does the government want a self-regulating media or not? 
 
                                                          
132
 R v Zundel (1992) 10 C.C.R (2nd) 193 and Edmonton Journal v Alberta (AG) (1982) 2 SCR 1326.   
44 
 
(b) What is the role of government in the control and regulation of the media? 
 
(c) Is the government proposing to reclaim the power to control and regulate 
the media?  
 
The current media laws are weak but there is room for improvement. The proposal 
by Cabinet to amend the Press and Journalists Act is not a call for draconian laws 
to control the media but it is necessary for clear indications on the duties and 
responsibilities of the media amidst weak state institutions to be stated such as 
those stipulated in the Public Order Management Bill, 2013. 
 
The government also needs to repeal the archaic and redundant laws such as 
sedition or cease to apply them as has been done in many other Common Law 
jurisdictions including Canada, England, Australia, India and Kenya. Uganda’s 
legal regime respecting freedom of expression is characterised by; (a) archaic and 
outdated restrictions (such as sedition) which only serve to undermine the 
enjoyment of the rights and in effect lead to a retardation of the democratisation 
process and (b) weak and inappropriate regulatory mechanisms such as the media 
council.  
 
It is recommended that the current legal regime governing media freedom needs to 
be reformed taking into account the decisions of the constitutional and Supreme 
courts and to address emerging challenges including effects of globalisation. The 
effect of amendment or repeal is that the laws will be brought into conformity with 
the Constitution.  
 
The government has acknowledged the effects of globalisation on the freedom of 
expression e.g. by enacting the Uganda Communications Act133 but developments 
in the media need to be watched on a permanent basis and require rapid and 
coordinated responses. Having in place archaic laws are not the means of achieving 
such objectives. New legal rules to address emerging challenges need to be 
developed. Specifically, further development of the legal regime pertaining to the 
freedom of expression in order to ensure its sustainability is paramount. The 
existence of an enabling legal regime and an appropriate political climate for free 
expression will ensure maximum enjoyment of that right. 
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It is reported that human rights are political by nature and therefore, they require 
the political will to implement and public scrutiny to maintain them. Thus, Uganda 
Commission of Inquiry into violations of human rights has observed 
“A country may have the best written Bill of Rights, but if the state organs and 
institutions, leaders at all unless, and every individual in the country are not 
committed and do not pay serious attention  to them, human rights as so 
guaranteed are not worth the papers they are written on”.134   
Government is well aware of the inherent nature of the freedom of expression 
under article 29 (1) (d) and the duty of government agencies to respect, promote 
and uphold this freedom. However, government also notes that this right is not 
absolute and where the right poses a threat to peace and public safety, then the 
right must be regulated accordingly within the ambit of article 43. 
 
Judicial review is however not the only remedy available for enforcement of 
fundamental rights and freedoms under the Constitution. Under article 50 if any 
person who claims that a fundamental or other right or freedom guaranteed under 
the Constitution has been infringed or threatened, he is entitled to apply to a 
competent court for redress which may include compensation. However this 
depends on strengthening of the institutions that are charged by the state to 
promote these rights and freedoms including the Uganda Human Rights 
Commission.135  
 
Although the role of the constitutional court in determining the constitutionality of 
every Act of Parliament is lauded, this might not necessarily be effective because 
not all the Acts enacted by Parliament are subjected to judicial review. 
Scholars have also warned that the “interpretation of the Constitution is primarily 
concerned with the recognition and application of constitutional values and not 
with a search to find the internal meaning of statutes.”136  
The judicial review role of the constitutional court is important because it prevents 
Constitution from being amended or overtaken by a legislative enactment of 
Parliament. 
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Whereas judicial review is not the only safeguard for protecting the freedom of 
expression, it is an important feature for the development of constitutionalism in 
Uganda and as discussed above, it has played a prominent part in ensuring that 
freedom of expression is enjoyed by citizens according to the Constitution. 
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